Introduction

A financial crisis in the US
First we review the dimensions of the recent crisis. We then present some historical narrative on earlier global crises in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The description of earlier global crises leads to a sense of déjà vu.
We next demarcate several chronologies of the incidence of various kinds of crises:
banking, currency and debt crises and combinations of them across a large number of countries for the period from 1880 to 2010. These chronologies come from earlier work of Bordo with Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria and with Chris Meissner , Bordo and Meissner ( 2007) ) , from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's recent book (2009) and studies by the IMF (Laeven and Valencia 2009,2010) .
1 Based on these chronologies we look for clusters of crisis events which occur in a number of countries and across continents. These we label global financial crises.
1 There is considerable overlap in the different chronologies as Reinhart and Rogoff incorporated many of our dates and my coauthors and I used IMF and World Bank chronologies for the period since the early 1970s.
International financial crises inevitably are associated with recessions. We then ascertain the impact of the global financial crises identified by our cluster analysis on real output in the countries affected. To do this we first demarcate business cycle turning points in the countries affected by the global crises and then measure the accumulated output losses in the recessions associated with the identified crises. Not surprisingly we find that the economic impact of the Great Depression dwarfed that of the recent crisis but so did several other historic global financial crises. We consider several factors that could explain the patterns of global financial crises. These include globalization, the gold standard and whether the US was in crisis. We conclude with some policy implications of our evidence.
Dimensions of the Recent Global Financial Crisis
The collapse in the subprime mortgage market after the collapse of a major housing boom in the U.S. (which had been propelled by expansionary monetary policy and long standing government policies encouraging home ownership) and the plunge in values of mortgage backed securities in the US in 1907, led to a crisis in the US Shadow banking system (non bank financial intermediaries that had issued and held mortgage backed securities) (Gorton 2010). These pressures led to liquidity shortages in the interbank wholesale markets that funded the financial A credit crunch and a pause in expansionary monetary policy in early 2008 reflecting a misplaced fear of commodity price hikes leading to inflation (Hetzel 2009 ) led to a recession in the US and Europe. The advanced country recession and a collapse in international trade finance greatly reduced exports from China and other emerging Asian countries as well as the rest of the world leading to a global downturn. In addition several eastern European countries were hit by crisis because they were overexposed to foreign currency denominated debt. They were rescued by the IMF.
The global crisis ended with government bailouts of insolvent banks, guarantees of the liabilities of the banking system, the provision of credit facilities to unclog financial markets and expansionary monetary and fiscal policy in many countries. The global recovery began in the summer of 2009 making the recession which began in late 2007 in the US and other countries the longest (and possibly the deepest one) in the postwar era.
Historical Patterns in International Financial Crises
We provide a brief narrative of events which could be characterized as global financial crises. We also demarcate several episodes which were primarily regional rather than global crises.
We first define our terms. The essence of a financial crisis is a banking crisis (Schwartz 1986 ). According to Bordo, Eichengreen et al ( 2001) "for an episode to qualify as a banking crisis ,we must observe either bank runs, widespread bank failures and the suspension of deposits into currency such that the latter circulates at a premium relative to deposits ( a banking panic), or significant banking sector problems( including but not limited to bank failures) resulting in the erosion of most or all of banking system collateral that are resolved by a fiscally underwritten bank restructuring'
This definition allows us to distinguish between pre 1914 banking panics in which lender of last resort intervention was either absent or unsuccessful, and subsequent crises in which a lender of last resort or deposit insurance was in place and the main problem was bank insolvency rather than illiquidity.
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Financial crises are aggravated when they lead to or are accompanied by currency crises (a speculative attack on a pegged exchange rate) and debt crises (sovereign debt defaults).
International financial crises are banking crises that are often accompanied by currency crises 2 Reinhart and Rogoff ( 2009) have a different more liberal definition " We mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large scale government assistance of an important financial institution ( or group of institutions) that mark the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions" page 10.
(twin crises) or by debt crises (or by both currency and debt crises together) that occur in multiple countries and across continents. They also involve both advanced and emerging countries.
Such events are often triggered by asset price booms and busts in key countries. Stock market and property booms often burst preceding financial crises (Bordo 2003) .
The world has seen a number of global financial crises since the beginning of the nineteenth century and even before . Before World War I they occurred in an environment of globalization-the integration of goods, labor and capital markets in which free capital mobility often was at the heart of asset booms and busts that led to crises. They also occurred under the classical gold standard which linked countries together by fixed exchange rates. In the interwar period major financial crises occurred after the world returned to the gold exchange standard. After World War II under the Bretton Woods system with pegged exchange rates, capital controls and extensive financial regulation, financial crises were rare although there were frequent currency crises. Since the early 1970s along with the switch to a floating exchange rate regime (for the advanced countries), the removal of capital controls, and the liberalization of domestic financial markets, international financial crises have reappeared.
The specie standard era
A number of international financial crises involving banking crises in London, the continent of Europe, the United States and Latin America occurred during the nineteenth century when most countries were on specie standards (silver, gold, bimetallism). Also in that century after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, globalization in trade and capital increased dramatically (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson 2003) . We briefly demarcate several events in the nineteenth century before our data starts in 1880 and then the crisis events after 1880.
The first international financial crisis was the crisis of 1825 (Neal 1998 , Bordo 1998 . The crisis of 1873 had a global reach. According to it started with the collapse of a property boom in Germany and Austria, then spread through the continent and affected the US as European investors dumped US railroad stocks. The US had a major panic associated with a corporate governance scandal in the railroad sector (Benmelech and Bordo 2008) . The collapse of that sector contributed to a serious and drawn out recession. The crisis spread to Latin America via a sudden stop as the Bank of England raised its bank rate to offset gold outflows (Catao 2006) . This led to a series of debt defaults across the region and a banking crisis in Peru (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) 
The Classical gold standard era 1880-1913
The pre World War I classical gold standard era witnessed two major global financial crises; [1890] [1891] [1892] [1893] [1907] [1908] . In both periods banking, currency and debt crises occurred in countries across the world. In some of the countries affected output losses were very large (Bordo and Eichengreen 1999) .
1890-1893
In the 3 year span there were two big crises centered on 1890 and 1893 with crisis events also occurring in the intervening years. In an environment of continued financial stringency following the Baring crisis, a major twin crisis broke out in the US in 1893 reflecting concerns over threats by the Free Silver movement to its continued adherence to the gold standard (Friedman and Schwartz 1963 ).
Australia had a major banking panic at the end of a land boom financed by British capital;
triggered by a decline in the terms of trade. Other countries in crisis in 1893 included New Zealand, Italy, Greece and several Latin American countries. In this period Murshid (2002 and 2007) find evidence of both contagion between the core and periphery countries and a significant risk of a global financial crisis.
The second major global financial crisis was in 1907. A banking panic in the autumn in the US was at the heart of it. It may have been triggered by the Bank of England discriminating against merchant banks financing US trade following large payments by British insurance companies to cover losses stemming from the San Francisco earthquake (Odell and Wiedenmeir 2005) .Other countries hit by banking crises included France, Italy(which had a twin crisis), Denmark, Sweden, Japan, Chile and Mexico. This crisis led to significant output losses in several countries (Bordo and Eichengreen 1999) .
The last big crisis in this era was in 1914 at the outbreak of World War One reflecting a global demand for liquidity. Massive lender of last resort operations ( eg the US invoked the Aldrich Vreeland Act and issued emergency currency),the closing of stock exchanges and the imposition of capital controls in many countries prevented panics in many countries .
The Interwar period 1919-1939
The interwar period is notorious for financial crises. They occurred in two waves: 1920-25 and 1929-33.
The crises of the 1920-25 period reflected the attempts globally by central banks to unwind the inflation that had built up in the War. It also reflected global imbalances reflecting shifts in the pattern of global production and agriculture. Disinflation impinged upon the balance sheets of many European countries leading to banking crises in the Scanadanavian countries, the Netherlands, Italy as well as in Japan, Mexico and elsewhere. Some of these were twin crises.
The brief global recession of 1920-22 was quite severe.
1929-33: The Great Contraction.
This episode is infamous as the worst of all crisis periods. It was preceded by stock market crashes in the US and UK. A series of banking panics in the US beginning in October 1930 were not successfully allayed by the Federal Reserve (Friedman and Schwartz 1963 and Landon Lane 2010) and turned a serious recession into the Great Depression. The depression was transmitted around the world by the fixed exchange rate links of the gold exchange standard (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and by the implosion of international fiduciary currency reserves built upon a thin film of international gold reserves (Bernanke 2002 ).
Adherents to the gold exchange standard who lacked credibility were prevented by "golden fetters" from offsetting banking panics (expansionary monetary policy would have led to a speculative attack on the gold parity) which proliferated across Europe, (Eichengreen 1992) .
Many countries across the world also were hit by debt and currency crises. Countries only extricated themselves from depression when they left the gold standard and followed expansionary monetary policy. The banking panics and deep deflation greatly worsened the real economies of countries which experienced them (Bernanke and James 1991) . War II: Bretton Woods 1944 -1973 In the Bretton Woods adjustable peg regime characterized by widespread capital controls and extensive financial regulation designed to prevent a reoccurrence of the financial chaos of the interwar, there were very few banking crises (or debt crises). However there were frequent currency crises as many countries were unable to align their domestic financial policies with their pegged currencies (Bordo 1993) .
Post World
The Managed Float and a Return to Globalization 1973 -2010
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system the global financial economy reopened.
In addition, in the face of high inflation many controls on the banking and financial system began to crumble. The financial crisis problem of earlier eras returned.
The 1970s.
Banking crises erupted in both advanced and emerging countries in the 1970s. In 1974 in the US, Franklin National bank was bailed out while in Germany Herstatt bank was not. Neither of these events were classic banking crises. Other European countries witnessed significant bank failures as did other parts of the world. In the emerging countries there were scores of currency crises. However in this decade it is difficult to discern a global financial crisis.
The 1980s.
The 1970s 
The 1990s
The 1990s was characterized by three regional financial crises: in Europe 1990-91, the Tequila Crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
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Europe
The liberalization of financial markets in many countries in the late 1980s led to a series of financial crises. In the Nordic countries freeing the banks from extensive controls led to a property boom in Sweden and Finland. A bust was triggered by the EMS crisis and the breakdown of the Soviet empire. These forces produced the Nordic banking and currency crisis (Jonung and Hagberg. 2005) . Banks also failed in Norway. Other countries like Italy and
Australia also had banking crises in this period.
The Tequila crisis.
Tight Federal Reserve policy in reaction to an inflation scare may have been the trigger for a massive devaluation by Mexico in 1994. This led to a banking crisis and a rescue package arranged by the US. Other Latin countries also were hit by debt, banking and currency crises referred to as the tequila effect. Impact on the advanced countries was minimal.
The Asian Crisis 1997-1998.
The causes for the massive currency and banking crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Korea as well as less dramatic disruption in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan include:
overvalued currency pegs, original sin (liability dollarization,) the drying up of Japanese lending after its banking crisis, corporate malfeasance and corruption. These crises had contagion effects on other emerging countries possibly reflecting stringency in advanced country lending. Two prominent countries were Russia which defaulted on its debt in 1998 and Brazil which had a serious currency crisis in 1998. A threat by the Russian Crisis to the advanced countries by the incipient collapse of LTCM, a large hedge fund, which was greatly exposed to Russian debt which seriously exposed the balance sheets of important counterparties( including New York money center banks) to loss, , was offset by a Federal Reserve arranged rescue.
The Asian crisis had impact across many emerging countries but did not seriously impact the advanced countries. However many have argued that if it weren't for the generous rescue packages provided by the IMF, other governments, and other agencies it would have become one.
On the other hand, others have argued that the rescues were largely bailouts which would engender future moral hazard (Bordo and Schwartz , 2000) .
Empirical Evidence
Identifying Global Crises
In order to quantify the effect that a global financial crisis has on a country's real economy (business cycle) we first need to identify periods of global financial distress. To do this we assemble information on three types of financial crises: banking crises, currency crises, and sovereign debt crises. We have 57 countries in our sample which runs from 1880 to 2009.
Multiple sources were used to accumulate information on these three types of crises and the information obtained was aggregated into our database. The raw data on banking crises can be found in Figure A .1 in the appendix and the raw data on currency and debt crises can be found in We do not distinguish between major and minor banking crises.
In order to identify periods of global crisis we first look for clusters of crises. To do so, for each year, we count the number of crises for each category. These raw counts are reported in
Figures A4 -A6 in the appendix. 4 Candidate global crises are then identified using a centered moving sum of order 2 of these raw counts. That is for each period we count the number of unique crises for the current period and the preceding and following period as well. Peaks in the two-period moving sum series are candidates for periods of global financial crises.
One important consideration, however, is that not all countries are the same in the sense that a crisis in a large country (e.g. the U.S.) is different to a crisis in a small country (e.g. New
Zealand) in its effect on the global economy. To account for this effect we weight each observation by the country's per capita GDP relative to U.S. GDP. 5 If a banking crisis occurs in a country who's GDP per capita is half that of the United States then the observation is given a weight of 0.5. This weighted count thus reflects the relative importance of the country (in terms of its size) when deciding whether a cluster of banking crises constitutes a global financial crisis.
In determining whether a cluster is a global crisis we use the following rule: 1) we find a local peak of the two-period moving sum of the weighted count series, y t . A local peak is defined to be a period (t) where 
In case of ties, ( 2) The local peak, found in 1), has a value greater than 5 (thus the cluster must be large enough to be the equivalent of concurrent crises in five countries equal in size of the U.S), and 3) the countries making up the cluster must be from different geographical regions.
The preceding rule is applied to the data on banking crises, currency crises, and debt crises individually. It is also applied to a combined banking and currency crisis dataset to look for global "twin"-crises and to a combined banking, currency and debt crisis dataset to identify global "triple"-crises, to a combined banking and debt crisis and to a combined debt and currency crisis data set. The results are given below:
Global Banking Crises
The two-period weighted moving sum banking crisis series is depicted in Figure 1 . The horizontal dashed line represents the threshold for (partly) determining a global crisis. Using the rule outlined above we found global banking crises in the following periods: 1890-1891, 1907-1908, 1913-1914, 1931-1932, 1982-1983, and 2007-2008 . The countries involved in each of these global banking crises are reported in Table 1 . 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 In all of the identified periods countries from at least two (and usually more) distinct geographical regions are present. The most recent global crisis only contains countries from North America and Europe whereas the other crises contain countries from at least three distinct geographical areas. It is also evident from Figure 1 that the most recent global banking crisis ranks second in terms of the weighted sum of countries having banking crises. Using raw numbers (i.e. weighting all countries equally) the most recent crisis would only be ranked fourth amongst all the global banking crises that we identify.
Robustness
In order to check whether the robustness of the global crises identified using the twoperiod moving sum we also use the same identification method using a three-period moving sum.
That is we look for peaks in the three-period moving weighted sum of the number of crises and identify a global crisis if the weighted sum of crises for a two year period is greater than 5.
When using the three-period moving sum we identify the same crises windows as reported in Table 1 plus some extra ones. We identify a banking crisis in 1921-25, in 1989-91 and in 1995-97. The crisis windows in the 1920's and 1990s do not accord well with the narratives and it appears that in both cases the three period moving sum has aggregated two separate small crises into one big enough to be considered a global crises. For example, the identified crisis in the 1990's joins two well know regional crises together: the 1994-95 (mainly)
Latin American and the 1997-98 Asian banking crises. In the 1920's there were two relatively small clusters of crises (1920-21 and 1923-24 ) and it appears that the three-period moving sum has aggregated them together so that the weighted sum of the frequency of banking crises is enough to make it identified as a global crises. The three-period moving sum and the Table   outlining the countries included in the crises can be found in Appendix B.
Global Currency Crises
Figure 2 depicts the three period moving sum of the weighted count of currency crises where again the weights are relative GDP per capita in 1990 dollars. Using the same rule as described above we identify the following periods as global currency crises: 1931-1932, 1949-1950, 1967-1968, 1970-1971, 1975-1976, 1981-1982, 1985-1986, 1992-1993, 1997-1998, and 2000-2001 . The countries involved in these global currency crises are reported in Table 2 . 
Robustness
Again we also checked the robustness of the identified global currency crisis windows using an alternative three-period weighted moving sum and these results are depicted in Figure   B .2 and the identified countries are reported in Table B .2 of Appendix B. This time there are two more global crises identified with crises during the 1920's and the mid 1990's. All of the periods identified in Table 2 are also identified using the three-period moving sum. One reason to suspect that the three-period moving sum identifies more crises is that when there are two small crises whose peaks are separated by one year, the three-period moving sum aggregates these two small crises into one bigger crisis. 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Debt Crises
Global "Twin"-Crises
In the preceding sections we separately identified global crises for banking, currency, and debt crisis. We found two periods where there were both global banking and global currency crises. However, this approach did not check whether the countries included in each type of crisis overlapped or were different. That is, we do not know whether in these periods there were both a banking crisis and a currency crisis occurring in parallel (i.e. to two different sets of countries) or in unison (i.e. to the same countries). In this section we compute the weighted count of the countries having "twin" banking and currency crisis concurrently. The moving sum of this weighted count of "twin" crises is depicted in Figure 4 . where there was both a banking crisis and a currency crisis but that these crises affected different sets of countries. 
Global "Triple" Crises
Previously we did not identify any periods where there were any global debt crises. In this section we compute weighted counts of countries having all three crises at once and the moving sum of these weighted counts is depicted in Figure 7 . Again there are no periods that we can identify where there were a significant number of countries having "triple" crises. 
Comparing and Quantifying the Crises
In Section 5 we used informal "cluster" analysis to identify global crises. In that section we combined data sets on crises from a number of sources and counted the number of observed crises to look for clusters of crises across the world. In this section we turn our attention to quantifying the "cost" of a recession and compare these costs across the different types of crisis and non-crisis periods. In order to be consistent we use a restricted dataset that consists of countries for which we have data that span the entire sample period from 1880-2009. This restricted set of countries is nonetheless quite varied and consists of countries from many regions, a variety of levels of development, and a variety of levels of openness.
The countries that are included in this analysis are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, Uruguay, and
The United States of America. In order to quantify the loss caused by a recession we first date business cycles for each country by looking for peaks and troughs of real output for each country using a common business cycle dating algorithm. We then compute the cost of each recession for each country and compare this cost across the many different types of crisis periods identified above.
The set of countries included in our analysis is kept constant over the whole sample even though data for other countries becomes available over time as we wanted to keep a consistent set of countries for the analysis and to not bias our results. If the countries to be added were chosen randomly one would not expect the results to be affected by the addition of extra countries in the later periods but it is fair to assume that the availability of data is not a random event and most likely a function of a country's development. Also the aim of this exercise is to compare recessions across different crisis periods so it is important to have a consistent set of countries across time.
Data
The data that we use is real output in constant 1990 dollars and comes from the dataset compiled by Angus Maddison. 6 This methodology is described in more detail in Maddison 
Identifying Cycles and Measuring Loss.
In order to have a consistent set of dating rules across each country in our sample we use the business cycle dating procedure of Bry and Boschan (1971) that was updated by Pagan (2000, 2002) . Here we date the classical cycle -that is the turning points of the level of real output -using the following rules: 1) the minimum length of a cycle is two years, 2) a recession or an expansion has to be at least one year in length, 3) peaks and troughs must alternate. The actual peak years and trough years that we use can be found in Table A .1 of Appendix A.
It should be noted that we could have alternatively looked at growth-cycles -turning points in the growth rate of real output -but in order to be consistent across the whole sample period of 1880-2009 we only compare classical cycles. This means that for latter periods, where the growth of real output is high, some countries have very long cycles.
There have been many different approaches to quantifying the loss of a recession. Some, for example and Laeven and Valencia (2010) use a measure of how long the economy took to get back to a measure of "potential" output as a measure of the severity of the recession. discuss a number of different approaches to measuring the severity of a recession including duration (time from peak to trough), amplitude (percentage loss from peak output to trough output) and accumulated loss (the sum of the percentage differences from peak output to all output levels for each period of the recession). This last measure approximates the area above the actual level of output and the projection of peak output out horizontally for the duration of the recession. also use a measure of the steepness of the recession by measuring the difference between the actual accumulated loss and the loss if actual output followed a straight line from peak output to trough output -which they call an excess loss measure.
In our approach we use the accumulated percentage loss as our measure of the severity of a recession. This measure has the benefit of combining information about the recession's depth and duration into one number. The problem with using only amplitude or only duration is that it would be hard to compare a short but sharp recession with a long but shallow recession. Which there is not enough data to compute this measure. Since we are not able to use this duration measure to compare the severity of recessions across the different periods with the most recent recessions we do not report the severity measures of .
Results from our Comparisons
As noted above we use a consistent classical business cycle dating algorithm to date [-17.56, -3.18] In order to account for country size we weight each loss measure by the country's GDP per capita relative to that of the United States.
Once we compute the measure of severity for each recession we then compare the severity of recessions over all of the sample and in particular during periods of crisis. Some summary statistical results on the severity of the recessions can be found in Table 5 . The statistics that are reported are the mean of the distribution, the median of the distribution, and the 25 th and 75 th percentiles (the inter-quartile range).
The first number that is reported in Table 5 is for all recessions in our sample. The mean weighted (weighted by relative GDP per capita) accumulation percentage loss for all recessions in our sample is -5.72% but it is clear that the distribution of accumulated losses is highly skewed to the left as the median and 25 th and 75 th percentiles are much smaller at -2.01%, -5.02%, and -0.62% respectively. Thus the distribution of accumulated loss of a recession is skewed to the left with a large number of large negative losses. That is, the distribution has a "fat" lower tail.
Next we report the mean, median, and inter-quartile range for those recessions that do not overlap any of the crisis (banking, currency, or debt) periods and for those that do overlap with any of the crisis periods. 8 The mean accumulated loss during a crisis period is approximately two percentage points higher than for recessions that occur outside of any of the crisis windows. The median and 25 th percentiles are also shifted left suggesting that recessions during crises are worse, in terms of accumulated percentage loss, than recessions during non-crisis periods.
We next split the crisis periods into their respective types and report results for the three types of crises that we identify: banking crises, currency crises, and debt crises. Looking first at pure banking crises (periods where there is only a global banking crisis) we observe that the loss distribution is heavily skewed to the left with a mean loss of around -10.66% and a median loss of around -4%. We also split the sample into those countries that actually have a banking crisis and those who do not (but nonetheless have a recession during a global banking crisis) and find little difference between the two.
There was no debt crises identified that was separate from any other crisis so no results for "pure" debt crises are reported.
The pattern for the "pure" currency crises is different. Again a pure currency crisis is a period where there is only a currency crisis and not a banking crisis. First it is clear that recessions during currency crises are not as severe as during banking crises and the other difference is that there appears to be a discernable difference between those countries having a currency crisis (their recessions are worse) than those not having a currency crisis but having a recession during a currency crisis.
The numbers reported in Table 5 are losses that are weighted by a countries relative GDP per capita to US GDP per capita. This has the effect of condensing the distribution of the loss associated with "pure" currency crises as a number of countries having currency crises are small.
What we observe from Table 5 is that banking crises are worse than currency crises. We also see that during banking crises windows there is little difference between the outcome of all countries and those countries having crises which suggests that there is some degree of spillover from crisis countries to non-crisis countries during banking crises. For currency crises, the countries having currency crises do slightly worse than non-crises countries. If one looks at the unweighted numbers the median loss for all countries during a currency crisis is -2.81% while the mean loss for countries actually having currency crises during this period is -4.15%. The unweighted medians for banking crises are -8.00% and -8.58% respectively. This is suggests that currency crises do not affect non-crisis countries as much as banking crises.
There was one period identified as having a twin crisis and that was 1931-32. We report the results for this period in Table 5 for all countries having recessions in this period and then break the results into those having just a banking crisis, those having a currency crisis and those having a twin banking and currency crisis. There is little to distinguish between the different types of countries except to say that the weighted accumulated loss for this period is much higher than for either the "pure" banking crisis periods or the "pure" currency crisis periods.
Comparing Individual Banking Crises
The results of the previous section suggest that banking crises are the more important crises to consider given that recessions associated with them are large and there appears to be more spillover from crisis countries to other countries for banking crises than other types of crises. Because of this and the fact that the most recent crisis is a "pure" banking crisis we next focus our attention on the individual banking crises that we have identified.
The results reported in Table 5 are for all the banking crises across all periods and it is useful to be able to compare each crisis window to each other. This comparison is reported in Table 6 . Here the summary statistics are reported for each crisis window identified in Section 5.
The results show that clearly the banking crisis of the 1930's was associated with much more severe recessions than any other crisis window. The crises of 1890-91, and 1913-14 Another interesting point to note about the most recent crisis is that the tail of the accumulated loss distribution is not as fat as for the other preceding crises. Figures 8 and 8a contain boxplot graphs depicting the weighted accumulated percentage loss distributions for each of the identified banking crises windows. The boxplots graphically report the same information as Table 6 . More importantly they also report the tail of the distribution. Each boxplot reports a box which runs from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile. The red line reports the median.
The closer the red line is to the 75 th percentile (the top line of the box in this case) the more skewed the distribution. Any observations that lie outside the inter-quartile range are depicted with red '+' symbols.
Looking at Figures 8 and 8a we see that the most recent crisis is the only crisis without a very long lower (left) tail. Alternatively, if the distribution is skewed like the other crises the tail is much shorter. Unlike the other crises, there are no really large losses associated with the most recent crisis.
The conclusions one can draw from these observations is that the recessions associated with the most recent financial crisis were indeed quite unprecedented given 1) the fact that the output losses were at the low end of what we would have expected after looking at the previous major banking crises and 2) we did not observe any really large negative losses (no fat left tail). This is unprecedented given the previous experience of global banking crises. 1890-1891 1906-1907 1913-1914 1931-1932 1982-1983 2007-2008 -100 1890-1891 1906-1907 1913-1914 1931-1932 1982-1983 2007-2008 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0
Discussion
Our empirical evidence in the preceding section indicates that since 1880 the world has witnessed 6 global financial (banking) crises. 9 This result is based on our aggregation of several chronologies of banking crises where we calculate a moving sum of the weighted counts by country size and condition on crisis incidence across continents. When we add in currency crises and search for global twin crises we only find one in the 1930s. When we add debt crises to the total we find that no triple global crises occurred. In terms of incidence weighted by country size the 1930s was the worst global crisis by far, followed by the recent crisis. Although the number of countries affected by crises was lower than some of the historic crises, the presence of the US and other major countries makes the recent crisis important in terms of the number and size of countries involved.
We also measured the output losses in global crises. We used a business cycle dating algorithm to date classical business cycles and for each recession we computed the accumulated percentage loss as our measure of the severity of a recession. We found that the distribution of recessions associated with crises was highly skewed with a fat left tail and that the mean accumulated percentage loss was higher for recessions associated with crises than those that
were not associated with crises. We also found that recessions associated with banking crises were worse than those associated with currency crises and we found that banking crises appeared to affect all countries more than currency crises. The losses during recessions associated with currency crises were larger for those countries having a currency crisis than those that did not.
We then compared the 6 global banking crises that we identified and found that the Moreover from our evidence we see that there is a clear link between international financial crises and the severity of recessions. Indeed global crises may help synchronize the business cycle (Bordo and Helbling 2010) .
We summarize some possible factors that can explain the incidence of global financial crises. First, international financial crises since at least 1857 seem to occur when the US (the largest economy since the end of the nineteenth century) is involved. One strong possible reason for the U.S. involvement in global financial crises is that the US banking system has long been crisis prone. In the pre 1914 era this reflected two basic problems; unit banking and the absence of an effective lender of last resort. This contrasted with many of the other advanced countries which had nationwide branch banking systems which could more easily diversity portfolios across regions and also which had central banks which had learned by the 1870s to act as lenders of last resort to the financial system. .London was also important as a focal point for the global transmission of crises before 1914 but the Bank of England had learned to become an effective lender of last resort. England had its last banking crisis in 1866.
Since 1914 the US has had a central bank, the Federal Reserve, which was established in large part to prevent the type of banking panics which characterized the National banking era (1965 to 1914) . However the Fed failed in its role as lender of last resort to allay a series of banking panics in the 1930s which it is argued precipitated the Great Depression. In addition the These patterns have reemerged in the second era of globalization since the 1970s.
Third, the international monetary regime was also important in the proliferation of crises.
When the world was on the gold standard both before and after World War I, crises were transmitted by fixed exchange rates and in the interwar when credibility was low "golden fetters" prevented many countries from offsetting them. Moreover the alternating waves of inflation and deflation that reflected the automatic operation of the gold standard pre 1914 may have itself triggered financial instability leading to crises (Bordo 1990 Fourth, asset booms fueled by capital inflows and busts triggered by sudden stops were key elements in many of the international financial crises pre WWI. In the interwar the 1920s stock market boom was similar in many respects to the railroad booms of the nineteenth century and was fueled by international capital flows (Eichengreen 1992 , Bordo 2003 . Finance for both the tech boom of the late 90s and the recent property booms in the US and elsewhere had an important international element manifest in the international scope of securitization and the global proliferation of derivatives.
Policy Lessons
What are some of the policy lessons to be learned from the historical record of global financial crises?
First, the historical record suggests that international financial crises before 1914 largely burned themselves out. Countries which had effective LLRs in place like Britain insulated themselves from them. Others did not and like the US had to suspend convertibility of bank liabilities into currency. Also the absence of a lender of last resort in the U.S. and key flaws in its banking system made it an important catalyst for international crises because of its economic importance. Moreover in this era although there was minimal policy coordination eg between the Bank of England and the Banque de France in the 1907 crisis, it was minimal and episodic ( Flandreau 1997, Bordo and Schwartz 1998) .In the interwar period the League of Nations was largely ineffective in coordinating rescues as were other intergovernmental arrangements (Bordo and Schwartz 1999) .
In the postwar the IMF and other agencies has dealt with currency crises and debt crises to some effect. The resolution of banking crises has been largely done by national monetary authorities. The growing problem of liability dollarization prevented LLR operations in dollars in the Asian countries hit by crisis in 1997-98. Their problems were solved by massive international rescues. A similar problem arose in the aftermath of the recent crisis.
In the recent crisis the question is moot whether international policy coordination was effective. Many countries did lender of last resort actions to stem the financial crisis in their own countries. They also pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. These actions likely prevented the recession from being worse. It is not clear that national authorities pursued these actions because of international arrangements. More likely they did it because they had learned some lessons from the Great Depression.
The lesson from history that countries with sound financial systems, effective lenders of last resort and efficient financial supervision and regulation fared better in global financial crises than others has held up in the recent crisis ( Bordo and Meissner 2005 Second, what seems to be novel about the recent crisis is the extent to which financial innovation partly in response to the supervision and regulation of the banking systems and financial markets in place in the US and other advanced countries led to the development of securitization, derivatives and off balance sheet entities designed to evade capital requirements.
These innovations were globally linked through financial globalization. This increased global systemic risk. In earlier eras, stock (and bond) markets across countries were linked together during crises but the linkages are much tighter today and occur across virtually all international financial markets. This development may make the case for enhanced global financial supervision and regulation to ameliorate the systemic risks. Although how to achieve this in the face of the sanctity of sovereignty is problematic to say the least. It also may make the case for capital controls. However it is not clear that the inefficiencies of widespread capital controls and the inevitability of their evasion are worth the effort.
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